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CIVIL PROCEDURE: FINAL JUDGMENT RULE: STATE
COURT VENUE DETERMINATION CONSIDERED
FINAL FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL
THE FINAL judgment rule requiring that judgments, decrees, and
decisions of state and federal district courts be "final" in order to
be reviewable has long been an important requisite to the exercise
of federal appellate jurisdiction.' Recently the Supreme Court
apparently relaxed its rigid insistence on finality and reviewed a
state court venue judgment heretofore considered interlocutory. In
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,2 the Court held it had jurisdic-
tion to review a judgment of the Texas Supreme Court, affirming,
prior to trial on the merits, a trial court determination that venue
in the case was properly laid. The Court did so on the ground that
the judgment determined a substantial claim, pertaining to a sepa-
rate and independent matter, anterior to the merits, the immediate
determination of which would serve the policy underlying the re-
quirement of finality by avoiding long and complex litigation which
might be of no avail if consideration of the claim were postponed
until the conclusion of the proceedings. 3
The case involved an action against two national banks and
other parties for conspiracy to defraud. Each bank filed a plea of
privilege, claiming the right, under a federal statute, to be sued only
in the county in which it was located. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, relying upon a state venue statute, filed suit in a county in
-which neither of the banks was located. The trial court dismissed
the banks' motions for change of venue and the Texas Supreme
I "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: ... (2) By
appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958).
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had
in the Supreme Court." (Emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
The rule was incorporated in the original Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22,
25, 1 Stat. 73. See generally, 1 BARRON 8- HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 57 (1960, Supp. 1962); 3A BARRON & HOLTZOrr, op. cit. supra § 1552; 6 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 54.11-.14 (2d ed. 1953, Supp. 1962) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; Note,
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HFutv. L. Ruv. 351 (1961).
- 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
21d. at 558.
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Court affirmed. Because of the conflict between the state and federal
statutes, the defendant banks appealed to the Supreme Court.4 The
Court was thus faced with the issue whether the state court judgment
satisfied the requirement of finality.
As noted in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma,5 considera-
tions relating to the smooth functioning of the judicial system under-
lie the finality requirement. First, there exists the policy against
premature adjudication of constitutional questions. Second, there
is the fact that the interlocutory question sought to be appealed
from may be mooted by trial on the merits.6 Third, the trial may
generate additional federal questions which make relevant the
Court's policy against fragmentary review.7 In this regard, the final
judgment rule has been referred to as "essential to the achievement
of a 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,' "8
necessary in order to avoid "the delay in reaching trial finality which
ensue[s] when piecemeal appeals are permitted."9  Moreover, the
finality requirement guarantees that potential conflict between state
and federal courts will be kept to a minimum and thus "derives
added force when the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked to upset
the decision of a State court."'1
' The appeal was brought pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2) (1958),
note I supra.
334 U.S. 62, 69-71 (1948). The Supreme Court here refused to review the deci-
sion of a state supreme court which affirmed an interlocutory order directing that a
producer of natural gas take it "ratably" from the well of another producer by con-
necting their pipelines. The Court refused to review the order in spite of the fact
that the state court had interpreted the order as directing immediate compliance or
a shutting down of the producer's wells.
OId. at 71. It can be seen, for example, that if in the National Bank case the
appellants won on the merits, they certainly would not appeal the venue decision.
7 Ibid. See generally 6 Mooam 54.11; Note, 75 HAacv. L. Rzv. 351-52 (1961).
8 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) (divesture order re-
serving final ruling held final).
1 Paliaga v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1962) (order denying
third-party plaintiff's motion to proceed with trial of its claim held final).
1oRadio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945). Here the de-
fendant appealed from a judgment of the state supreme court which reversed the
trial court and directed that a lease and license previously transferred to the defendant
for the operation of a radio station be set aside. The judgment further directed that
an accounting of the defendant's operation of the radio station be made by the trial
court and a decree entered accordingly. Before the accounting was completed, the
defendant petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, contending
that only the Federal Communications Commission and the federal courts, and not
the state courts, had jurisdiction over the subject matter. The state supreme court had
rejected this argument, holding that its action was not inconsistent with the Federal
Communications Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to grant, transfer and annul
licenses.
In denying that it had jurisdiction to review the judgment, the Supreme Court said
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In determining what constitutes final judgments, the federal
appellate courts, in reviewing district court decisions, and the Su-
preme Court, in reviewing the judgments of state courts, apply the
same criteria.1 These criteria have been defined by the Supreme
Court in the following language: to be reviewable the judgment
must be final and complete, as to the entire subject matter and all
the causes of action; 12 it must effectively determine the litigation on
the merits,' 3 and not merely interlocutory or intermediate steps
therein;' 4 and it must fully determine the rights of the parties so that
nothing remains to be done by the trial court except to enter the
judgment which the appellate court has directed.'0
However, the courts have recognized that some flexibility is
needed in order to prevent the undue harshness that would result
from a rigid application of the finality rule. Therefore the rule
has been made subject to certain exceptions. In Local 438, Constr.
& Gen. Laborers' Union v. S. J. Curry & Co.,' 6 an opinion handed
that because of the potential federal-state conflict, Congress has granted it "the power
to intervene in State litigation only after 'the highest court of a State in which a
decision in the suit could be had' has rendered a 'final judgment or decree.'" Ibid.
11Although appellate jurisdiction in the two instances is derived from different
statutory sources, see note 1 supra, the cases do not appear to distinguish between
the judgments of state courts and those of federal district courts in determining
whether such judgments are final. See, e.g., the language used by the Supreme Court
in the following cases: Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956); Gospel Army v.
Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543, 546 (1947); Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S.
548, 551 (1945); R.H. Arnold Co. v. Guimarin & Co., 263 U.S. 427, 434 (1923). More-
over, the courts cite state and federal cases interchangeably. See, e.g, Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). In Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36 (1920),
the Court, speaking of the terms later used in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1291 (1958), said that
"final decisions" means the same thing as "final judgments and decrees."
12 R.H. Arnold Co. v. Guimarin & Co., 263 U.S. 427, 434 (1923) (federal court of
appeals decision affirming merits but remanding case for jury determination of damages
held not final).
But see FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (b) which provides for entry of a final judgment upon
one or more but less than all the claims in a multiple claim action, thus making such
judgment appealable.
13 Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956) (federal district court decision
granting motion to dismiss held not final).
"I Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945) (state court judg-
ment affirming order of state commission held final).
IrGospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543, 546 (1947) (state court judgment
remanding case for new trial held not final).
16 371 U.S. 542 (1963). Here an employer, in a state court action against a union,
sought injunctive relief against picketing. The lower court refused temporary in-
junctive relief but the state supreme court held that the union's picketing violated a
state right-to-work statute and that the lower court erred in refusing the temporary
injunction. In reaching its decision, the state supreme court resolved the merits of
the case when it determined that the union's picketing was unlawful. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the union's claim that the subject matter
of the suit, that is, the union's right to picket, was within the exclusive jurisdiction
[Vol. 1963: 754
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down on the same day as the National Bank case, the Court discussed
at length two of these exceptions, utilizing them as alternative
grounds for appellate review of a state court judgment. One is the
collateral order doctrine under which a judgment is reviewable if
it does not contain an ingredient of the cause of action but instead
finally disposes of some collateral question which will not be merged
in the final judgment.l' This exception was firmly established in
the leading case of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.'s which
held final a district court decision exempting plaintiffs in a stock-
holder's derivative suit from filing a security bond as required by
state statute. There the Court said the judgment was appealable
because it
did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case
and will not be merged in final judgment. When that time comes, it
will be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights
conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably
irreparably. 19
The other exception arises where disposition of the collateral
question resolves and thus ends, for all practical purposes, the liti-
of the National Labor Relations Board. First, however, it was necessary for the Court
to consider whether it had jurisdiction over the state court's judgment with respect
to finality. In its argument before the Court, the union conceded that there was
nothing more of substance to be decided by the trial court. From these facts, the
Supreme Court held that the state supreme court judgment was final for purposes of
appeal.
11 See generally 6 MooRE 54.14; Note, 75 HAtv. L. RIv. 351, 364-67 (1961); Com-
ment, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 746, 748-51, 757-58 (1957). In Curry, Justice Harlan concurred
in the result but denied that the collateral order doctrine was applicable. He cited
Montgomery Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178
(1952), where appeal was made from a state supreme court decision upholding denial of
a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction against picketing. In that case the Supreme
Court said the decision was not a final judgment and the fact that the question might
be mooted and the picketing frustrated while awaiting the final outcome of the action
on the merits did not give the interlocutory judgment the aspect of finality required.
Had Curry and Ledbetter arisen in the federal district court there would have
been no problem in appealing the interlocutory judgment to the court of appeals for
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1958), states that, "courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continuing, modify-
ing, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions,
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court ....
18 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
'OId. at 546. Accord, Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
339 U.S. 684 (1949) (district court's order vacating an attachment held reviewable).
In Cohen, though the Court distinguished the factual situation as one falling
within the collateral order doctrine, it acknowledged the validity of the final judgment
rule, noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958) does not permit appeals, "even from fully
consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards final judgment in which they
will merge." 337 U.S. at 546.
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gation on the merits. In the Curry case the state supreme court
resolved the merits of the entire action in reaching its decision on
the interlocutory issue whether a temporary injunction against pick-
eting should be granted. The petitioner, asserting the right to
picket, conceded before the Supreme Court that he had no further
defenses to offer the trial court on the merits.20 Since there was
nothing more of substance to be litigated, the Supreme Court held
the judgment was final.21
The apparent effect of the National Bank case is to create a new
exception to the final judgment rule where the judgment involves
a substantial but independent matter, anterior to the merits, where
otherwise long and complex litigation on the merits may be for
naught. The decision cannot be justified under existing exceptions
to the rule. It does not fit within the collateral order doctrine be-
cause the state court's judgment as to venue will later be merged
in the final judgment on the merits and will cause no irreparable
injury in the meantime. Nor is it a situation, as in the Curry case,
where disposition of the collateral question resolved the merits of the
action. Moreover the facts of the case suggest that there were good
reasons, not for a relaxation of the finality requirement, but for a
determination that the judgment was merely interlocutory.22  And,
as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent,23 the Court has pre-
viously decided that a determination as to venue is not "final."
In Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Snell,24 the plaintiff's motion for a change
"See note 16 supra.
21 371 U.S. at 550-51. (Justice Harlan's concurrence was based on this exception.)
Accord, Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 379 (1953).
Other judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule have been established. One
of these, known as the Forgay-Conrad Rule, deals with decisions which, while making
a partial adjudication of the cause of action, direct that there be an immediate de-
livery of physical property, though an accounting or some other similar matter must
be completed before a final judgment can be handed down. The irreparable injury
that might result to the losing parties because of the transfer of property, were they
made to await the final outcome of the litigation before appealing, is the basis for
this exception. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); Forgay
v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 200 (1848). But see Republic Natural Gas Co. V. Okla-
homa, 334 U.S. 62 (1947), and Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945), where the
judgments were held not final though the facts seemed to call for application of the
Forgay-Conrad exception. See generally 6 MooRE 54.13. For the applicability of
the requirement of finality in multiple litigation, see 6 MooRE 54.15.
"As in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 (1947), such a deter-
mination would have the effect of avoiding possible piecemeal review, review of con-
stitutional questions which may later be mooted by trial on the merits, and unneces-
sary review of the decisions of state courts.
"3 371 U.S. at 574.




of venue was ordered granted by the state supreme court after an
inferior court had denied the motion. The defendant appealed,
arguing that the state venue statute on which the plaintiff relied was
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction,
declaring that although the order appealed from finally adjudged
the venue question, it was no different from dozens of other inter-
locutory orders made in the process of litigation of a suit and was
therefore not final.25  Likewise, in the National Bank case, Justice
Harlan pointed out that dismissal of appellants' pleas amounted to
no more than denial of a motion to dismiss, "a classic example of
an interlocutory ruling that is only a step towards ultimate disposi-
tion and is not in itself reviewable as a final judgment."26
It is submitted that rather than strain valid existing exceptions,
the courts might better employ other mitigating devices where they
consider it desirable to alleviate the strictness of the final judgment
rule. One such device is the use of a statutory listing of trial court
determinations from which immediate appeals will be allowed.27
25 Id. at 397.
"Indeed, scarcely an order is imaginable which does not finally dispose of some
particular point arising in the case; but that does not justify a review of such order,
until the action itself has been finally disposed of. If every order were final, which
finally passes upon some motion made by one or the other of the parties to a cause,
it might in some cases require a dozen writs of error to dispose finally of the case."
Ibid.
Likewise, appeals in the federal courts have been consistently rejected where the
order of the district court either granted or denied a motion to transfer a case from
one district to another for venue purposes. E.g., United States v. Brown, 301 F.2d
664 (4th Cir. 1962); Crummer Co. v. Du Pont, 196 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1952); Clinton
Foods v. United States, 188 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1951); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney,
186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951).
26 371 U.S. at 572. Accord, Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945). In Connell
v. Duben Steel Prod., 240 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1957), it was stated that refusal to
grant a motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional and other grounds is not appealable
as a final decision.
2 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1958) provides that courts of appeals shall have juris-
diction of appeals from:
"(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions . . . (2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers,
or refusing orders to wind up receiverships ... (3) Interlocutory decrees .. .deter-
mining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases . .. (4) Judgments
in civil actions for patent infringement which are final except for accounting." See
generally Note, 75 I-Lv. L. REV. 351, 367-75 (1961). The CAL. CODE OVIL PRoc.
§ 963 (2) (Deering 1953) provides that appeals may be taken from a superior court:
"2. From an order granting a new trial or denying a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, or granting or dissolving an injunction . . . or appointing a
receiver, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment, or changing or refusing
to change the place of trial ...."
See generally Note, 50 COLM. L. RFv. 1102, 1110 (1950) for a discussion of the
use of statutory listings.
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Another is the vesting of trial courts with discretion to authoiize
review, and/or appellate courts with discretion to grant review of
orders which would not otherwise satisfy the finality requirement. 28
A third device is the use of discretionary writs, such as the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari which can be granted without
regard to finality.29 It has been argued that the writ of mandamus
may provide the "most sensible and convenient solution" to the
problem.30
The National Bank case appears to overrule Cincinnati St. Ry. v.
Snell and seriously undermine the precedential value of those federal
appellate cases which have refused to review district court orders
28 E.g., FFD. R. Civ. P. 54(b) authorizes a trial court to expressly direct the entry
of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims in a multiple
claim action if it first makes an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay. See generally, 6 MooRE 54.27; Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351, 357-59 (1961).
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1958) provides for appellate review in federal civil cases of
orders not otherwise appealable under section 1292 when the district judge is of the
opinion that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion," and that immediate appeal from the
order "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." In such
a case he shall state such opinion in the order, and the court of appeals may there-
upon, "in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order .... " Thus
the statute provides that consent be given by both the district and appellate courts
before appeal will lie. For a discussion of this "double discretionary system" see
Note, 75 -ARV. L. REv. 351, 378-82 (1961); 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 746, 759-60 (1957). See
generally Note, 69 YALE L.J. 333 (1959).
Both the use of the statutory listing and the vesting of trial courts with discretion
to authorize review have their disadvantages. Courts have a tendency to interpret
statutory listings narrowly. And, it is possible that appeals from listed interlocutory
orders will be held mandatory rather than optional. In addition there will always
be cases of immediate hardship which are not provided for. Vesting discretion to
authorize review in the trial judge is a more flexible solution but the question exists
whether he can be sufficiently objective in examining his own rulings. One judge
might tend to deny review while another may be oversolicitous toward the complaining
party. Furthermore, the requirements for appeal would differ from court to court.
See Note, 50 CoLUm. L. REv. 1102, 1110-12 (1950).
29 The All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1958), provides that "the Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." See generally 6 MOORE 54.10, 54.43[l]; Note, 75 HARV. L. Rnv.
351, 375-78; 51 Nw. U.L. RFv. 746, 751-58 (1957); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 105 (1953).
3°Note, 50 CoLum. L. RFv. 1102, 1113 (1950). This writ has been used in the past
in state courts, despite its hazards, to secure immediate review of interlocutory rulings,
including orders granting or refusing to grant a change of venue. State ex rel. O'Neill
v. Pyle, 204 Ind. 509, 184 N.E. 776 (1933); Borden v. Miles, 130 Kan. 808, 288 Pac. 563
(1930). Federal appellate courts have used it, though with some reluctance, Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943), to review interlocutory rulings. In Ford
Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950), a petition
for writ of mandamus, was used to secure review of a venue order where the court
said the judgment was not final. But see Note, 75 HAv. L. Rav. 351, 377-78 (1961),
which questions whether mandamus will ever be used to provide discretionary review
of interlocutory orders on a broad scale.
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granting or denying a change of venue.31 Since one of the reasons
for adherence to the finality rule is not present in federal cases, that
of minimizing federal-state conflict, then a fortiori the holding of
the present case should apply to district court venue determinations.
Furthermore, the Court's decision has created a state of uncertainty,
not only in the area of venue determinations, but also in other areas
involving independent interlocutory judgments where immediate
review might avoid what would otherwise be long and complex, but
futile litigation on the merits. However if the decision-is only held
to apply to state court judgments its application may well be limited
because of the infrequency with which a question of federal pro-
cedure arises in a state court proceeding. The case may indicate a
tacit reluctance on the part of the Court to deny review in a situa-
tion where it feels a federal question has been wrongly decided,
even though the question is normally regarded as interlocutory and
hence not immediately reviewable. Since there seems to be no doc-
trinal support for the decision it might be interpreted as an effort
by the Court to provide for discretionary review of state court judg-
ments which are not otherwise appealable, as has been done in the
federal system under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1958).32 In the National
Bank case the state supreme court thought the judgment should be
reviewed; review made sense to the U.S. Supreme Court; therefore
it decided to take an ad hoc approach as is done under section
1292 (b), exercise its discretion, and review the decision. But, re-
view has heretofore been considered a matter of jurisdiction and
not of convenience. Whatever interpretation is given to the de-
cision it certainly points out the need for a more extensive discus-
sion of the finality question than was given it by the Court in the
present case if means are to be found of alleviating the strictness
of the final judgment rule without hampering the smooth function-
ing of our judicial system.
31 E.g., United States v. Brown, 201 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1962); Crummer Co. v. Du
Pont, 196 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1952); Clinton Foods v. United States, 188 F.2d 289 (4th
Cir. 1951); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 953 (1951).
1 See note 28, supra.
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